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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSUP.ANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM CHARLES
DENNIS,
Defendant and
Respondent,

No. 17267

vs.
JA.'1ES

c.

HOLDER, et al.,
Defendants-inIntervention and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory action filed by plaintiff
insurance company seeking a determination as to whether
William Charles Dennis is an additional insured under
the terms of a policy issued to his father.
DISPOSITION IN LOWE2 COURT
A jury trial was held in this matter on May 27
and May 28, 1980, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding.
The jury found that defendant William Charles Dennis was
not a resident of his father's household.

The lower court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendi:
finding that plaintiff had no obligation to indemnify or
defend William Charles Dennis in any action

or judg!i'ent

arising from an automobile accident on February 25, 1978.
On June 16, 1980, a hearing was held at which time
Defendants-in-Intervention moved for a judgment n.o.•.'. or,
in the alternative, for a new trial.

t~~

On July 14, 1980,

granted the motion for a judgment n.o.v., set aside the
findings of the jury from the previous judgment, and held
that plaintiff did owe an obligation to defend William

Char~

Dennis and to provide insurance coverage for any judgment
obtained as a result of the accident on February 25, 1978.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant Government Employees I:-isurance Corr.;:ian:·
seeks a reversal of the judgment notwithstanding the ··e:-:::.::
and a reinstatement of the judgment based :.i;:ion the jury's
finding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by plaintiff Government
Employees Insurance Company to determine whether William
Charles Dennis was insured under a policy issued to his
father, Donald R. Dennis.

Because this appeal is concerr.ed

solely with the issue as to whether there was a factual
question for the jury and as to whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding, it is
unnecessary and repetitious at this time to restate the e•ndence which will be argued infra to support appellant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contentions.

Rather, it is more germane for this Court

to understand the procedural events which occurred in
this litigation and the effect such events now have upon
this appeal.
On November 21, 1979, Plaintiff filed a complaint
for declaratory relief against defendant William Charles
Dennis.

(R. 2-4).

The complaint alleged that Plaintiff

had issued an insurance policy to Donald R. Dennis which
provided coverage for bodily injury liability to Donald
R.

Dennis and to other additional insureds who qualified

under the terms of the policy.

The complaint further alleged

that on February 25, 1978, William Charles Dennis, son of the
insured, was involved in an accident with an automobile
driven by James Holder and that a lawsuit had been subsequently filed in
Sen~is.

Sal~

Lake

Count~

against William Charles

Plaintiff sought a declaration that the plaintiff

did not owe any obligation of defense or payment to defendant
Willia~

Charles Dennis with respect to any claim arising

from the February 25 accident.
On November 28, 1979, an answer was filed on behalf
of defendant William Charles Dennis by his attorney Joseph
Fratto.

(R. 19-20).

On December 10, 1979, James C.

Holder, his wife and children, moved to intervene in the
action through their attorney, StephenMorqan.

(R. 52).

At that time they tendered an answer on behalf of Defendantsin-Intervention claiming that defendant William Charles
Dennis was covered under the terms of the plaintiff's policy.
lR.

21-25).
On December 28, 1979, the Holders' motion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to intervene was granted by the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson.

(R. 60-62).

On February 25, 1980, Defendants-in-Intervention
filed a motion for summary judgment.

( R.

63) .

On

February 28, 1980, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment.

(R.

On March 4, 1980, both motions

129).

were heard by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft and both
motions for sununary judgment were denied.

(R.

14 7) .

On March 21, 1980, Defendants-in-Intervention
filed their demand for a jury trial.

( R.

1 70) .

On

May 27, 1980, a jury trial was commenced with the Honorable
Jay E. Banks presiding.
May 28, 1980.

The trial continued through

(R. 196-197).

nesses and rested.

Plaintiff called four wit-

Defendant and

called no witnesses and rested.

Defendants-in-Interventio~

Defendant and Defendants-

in-Intervention moved for a directed verdict at the
termination of the testimony.
under advisement.

on

(R.

The court took the motions

197}.

May 28, 1980, the jury was read the court's

instructions and was given a special verdict form which
required it to answer the question of whether defendant
William Charles Dennis was a "resi:lent of '.i:'..s fat'.:er' s
household" on February 25, 1?78.
returned the form with the answer

"~Jo."

( ::<.

19 8) .

!Jn

May 30, 1980, a judgment on the verdict was signed b:·
Judge Jay E. Banks ordering that Plaintiff had no obligation under its policy with Donald R.

Dennis to pay,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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indemnify, or defend his son William Charles Dennis from
any action or judgment arising from the February 25,
1978 accident.

(R.

309-310).

On June 6, 1980, Defendant and Defendants-inIntervention moved for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
320).

(R.

311-

The motions were argued extensively on June 16,

1980, and the Court, at that time,

took the motions

under advisement.

On July 14, 1980,

(Tr.

523-572).

the lower court granted the motions for a judgrrent notwithstanding the verdict.

(R.

378).

After Plaintiff objected to the form of the judgment
notwithstanding the verdict originally signed by
(R.

~~e

court

379-380) , an amended judgment was executed by the lower

court

(R.

This form was also objected to and a

383-384).

third order was signed by the lower court entitled "Second
Amended Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict."
386) .

(R.

385-

It is from this order and judgment that the present

appeal is taken.

(R.

387).

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SETTING ~5IDE THE
JCDGMENT BASED CPON THE JURY'S FINDINGS A.'l'D

r;

E:JTERI~JG

~-

JUDGME~T )JOTWITHST.~NDING

':'HE "ERDICT.
It

~s

the contention of Plaintiff-Appellant that

the question of whether a person is an additional insured
under a policy insuring "relatives" who are "residents
of the insured's household" is, in almost all cases, a
question
of
fact.
In the
instant
case,
a review
Sponsored by
the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
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digitization provided
by the Institute
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record shows that there was a clear dispute as to the
inferences to be drawn from the facts produced by both
sides of this dispute as to whether defendant William
Charles Dennis was in fact "a resident of his father's
household."

Since there was substantial evidence to

support the jury's finding that

~e

was not such a resident

it was prejudicial error for the lower court to disregard
the jury's findings and to enter a judgment contrary to
the jury's determination.

Plaintiff's contentions will

now be examined in detail.
A.
The Determination of Whether a "Relative"
is a Resident of an Insured's Household
is a Factual Question.
Plaintiff-Appellant issued a general automobile
liability policy to Donald R. Dennis for a term commencing
November 20, 1977, and continuing through e<ovember 2 0, 1978.
The policy specifically insured a 1972 Caprice and a
1972 Chevrolet camper.

(Exhibit 2P).

Donald R. Dennis

in his application fbr the insurance listed himself and his
wife, Francis H. Dennis, as the sole operators of these
two vehicles.

(Exhibit 2P) .

It is undisputed that defendant William Charles
Dennis is neither a listed insured under the policy nor a
listed operator of the vehicles insured under the policy.
Thus, the only way in which coverage can be afforded to
Defendant is if he qualifies as an additional insured under
the general terms of the policy.
On February 25, 1978, defendant William Charles
Dennis was driving an automobile belonging to a Sandra
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

l

Freestone.

This suit, therefore, evolved around an

accident in which William Charles Dennis was driving a
vehicle not owned or listed by his father.

The pertinent

portion of the policy is limited as follows:
Persons Insured:
under Part I:

The following are insureds

* * *
b.

With respect to a nonowned automobile,
(1)
the named insured,
(2) any relative, but only with respect
to a private passenger automobile or
trailer

The term "relative" is defined by the policy as follows:
"Relative" means a relative of the named
insured who is a resident of the same
household.
Thus, the sole issue in this lawsuit was whether
the definition of "relative" applied to defendant.

In other

words, was defendant William Charles Dennis a resident of
his father's household?
The two words in controversy during this lawsuit
were "resident" and "household."

Plaintiff contended that

Defendant, while admittedly a relative of the insured, was
not residing in Donald Dennis' household as was required
o~·

t:-ie ;:iolic:.: and therefore was not insured.

Defendant and

Defendants-in-Intervention, on the other hand, contended
that William Charles Dennis was indeed a resident of his
father's household and was therefore covered.
It is elementary that terms contained in insurance
contracts are to be taken and understood in their plain,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ordinary, and common sense usage.

The test used to deter-

mine the meaning of such terms is simply what a reasonable
person would expect such terms to normally mean.
It has been stated that the purpose of including
coverage for unnamed insureds is to provide protection
for those whom, because of a close relationship, a person
obtaining a liability insurance policy would ordinarily
want to protect.

National Farmers Union Property and

Casualty Company v. Maca, 132 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 1965).
Expressions such as "residents of household" are used
to describe a "common type of close relationship varying
greatly in detail, where people live together as a family
in a closely knit group, usually because of close
relationship by blood, marriage or adoption and deal
with each other intimately, informally, and not at arms
length."

Id.

at 601.

In determining whether a person is an additional
insured under the terms of a policy, it is useful to examine
a dictionary-type definition of the terms in question.

For

example, the term "resident" is defined by Webster's
International Dictionary as "one who resides in a place"
or "one who dwells in a place for more or less duration.
Resident usually implies more or less permanence of aboce,
but is often distinguished from inhabitant as not implyinc
great fixity or permanency of abode."

Residency also

implies "dwelling, or having an abode, for a continued
length of time."

Great American Insurance Company v.

Marshall, 266 F.Supp. 208 (D.S.C. 1967).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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l

Likewise, the term "household" has been stated
as follows:
There is not much disagreement in the
definition of "household," whether they
emanate from judges or lexicopgraphers.
The word is synonymous with "family"
b..it broader, in that it includes
servants or attendants, "all who are under
one domestic head; persons who dwell
together as a family." Engebretson v.
Austdold, 271 N.W. 809, 810 (Minn. 1930).
While these general definitions of "residence" and
"household" are helpful, they do not provide the type of
criteria necessary to determine if a person becomes an
insured under the particular facts of that case.

For this

reason, c.o.urts have developed a number of factors to examine
the circumstances surrounding the claim, in order to determine
if the policy is applicable.
An extensive annotation dealing with the exact question

of what determines a "resident" or member of a "household"
states the general rule as follows:
A review of the cases construing or applying
the particular policy terms that are the
subject of the oresent annotation reveals
a wide variety ~f factual considerations
upon which the courts have focused in
their determination of whether a particular
person was a "resident" or "member" of the
same "household" or "family" as the named
insured at a particular time.
Those factual considerations not only relate
to the respective individual's physical
presence, or absence from, the named
insured's home during the period that
included the date of a particular occurrence,
but also relate to such matters as the
relationship (if any) of the individual
to the named insured, the circumstances
of such person's presence in or absence from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the named insured's home, the individual's
living arrangements during earlier
time periods and the individual's intention
at various times with regard to his place of
residence.
93 ALR 3d 420, 424.
More specifically, the courts have examined the
subjective or declared intent of the individual, Hardware
Mutual Casualty Company v. Horne Indemnity Company, 60 Cal.
Rptr., 508 (Cal. App. 1966); the formality or informality
of the relationship between the individual and the members
of the household, Parnparin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance
Company, 197 N.W.2d 783 (Wis. 1972); the existence of
another place of lodging by the alleged resident, State Far:
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Holloway, 423 F.2d
1281 (10th Cir. 1970); and the relative permanence or
transient nature of the individual's residence in the
household, Great American Insurance Company v. Marshall,
266 F.Supp. 208 (D.S.C. 1967).
Of all of these factors, the intention of the
parties is one of the most important evidentiary questions
to be considered.

As noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

"While it is true that 'actions sometimes speak louder
than words,' intention is a subjective state of mind

~o

be determined upon all of the facts includi!1g the dec:l:iration of the person inquired about.'
Insurance Company of Boston, 260

~.W.2d

241 (Wis. l?--1.

Likewise, the intended duration of a stay is also
an important factor to be examined since if a person
comes under the family roof for a definite short period
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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or for an indefinite period under such circumstances

that an early

termination

is highly probable, then it

is unlikely the person has become a member of the
household as intended by the insurance coverage.

~ation

wide Mutual Insurance Company v. Granillo, 573 P.2d 80
(Ariz. App. 1977).
In summary, therefore, whether a person is a
resident of the insured's household depends upon the
particular facts in each case.

Bartholet v. Berkness,

189 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1971). These facts involve a variety
of considerations in which the factf inder can utilize
in determining if the criteria necessary to qualify for
insurance coverage has been established.
This Court, in American States Insurance Company
v. Walker, 486 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1971), reviewed a number
of such factors in deciding whether a college student could
be considered a resident of her father's household.

The

lower court looked into the girl's intent and her statement
that she considered herself to be a resident of her father's
household while she was in school in Idaho.

The court

looked at the opening of a joint banking account with her
father and a telephone listing in her own name.

The court

examined her income and the fact that her father gave her
additional money to assist her in living expenses and in
returning home.

The court examined the type of furniture

and possessions she had with her in her apartment as opposed
~o

her father's house.

The court examined her voting resi-

dency in Idaho, her driver's license in Idaho, and her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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income tax statements.
This Court stated that the question of whether or
not a child ceases to be a member of the family household
after going away to school "must be determined from all of
the facts and circumstances as revealed by the evidence."
Id. at 1044.

This Court further stated, "It is our duty

to affirm him (the lower court) if there is any substantia;
evidence to sustain that ruling."

Id. at 1044.

Thus, the rule is clear that except in ex"traordi:ia::
cases in which a person clearly does not qualify as an
insured by any definition of the term, Bart ho let v. Berknes: I
189 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1971), it is for the trier of fact
to determine, based upon the circumstances and evidence
adduced at trial, whether the person can be said to be a
resident of the insured's household.
As stated by the leading authority Couch, "whether
a relative driving an insured vehicle is a resident of
the insured's household is a questionof fact."

Couch,

Couch or.. Insurance 2d, §45:276, p. 176 (Supp.)

In additior

~

I

there are a legion of cases holding that the ultimate
determination of whether a person is a resident of an
insured's household is solely a question of fact for the
trier of fact.

For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Hardesty v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 382 F. 2d 564 (10th Cir. 1967), has
amply demonstrated this principle.

In that case the

question was whether a son was a resident of his father's
household at the time of an accident.

In a previous

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

appeal,

361 F.2d 176, the Tenth Circuit reversed a

declaration by the trial court that, as a matter of
law, the son was not covered under the policy.
Upon the remand the trial court did not submit the
case to a jury but held, again, as a matter of law that
under the evidence reasonable men could only conclude that
the son was not a resident of the father's household.
The Tenth Circuit Court in the second opinion reversed the
lower court again and noted that the words "resident of the
same household" do not constitute a term of art which would
dictate a particularized legal inference to be drawn from
family relationships.

The court stated, "The function of

the court remains, then, to submit to the jury consideration of evidentiary facts from which different permissible
inferences may be drawn."

Id. at 565.

The Tenth Circuit Court then stated the following:
We reiterate that there is strong and cogent
evidence in the record which would lead
the factf inder to the conclusion that Ennis
Jr. was residing in the household of his
aunt who had reared and educated him since
he was eight years old with a minimum of
assistance of any kind from his father. Weighty
as this evidence may be, and thus proper for
the trial court's consideration in the discretionary function of ruling upon motions
for new trial, we cannot say such evidence
dictates a "one way" verdict as a matter of
law.
Id. at 565.
Thre is no doubt that there are nunerous cases
throughout the country in which it has been held that an
emancipated

child who has left the family residence

but who has returned for one reason or another can be
deemed as a resident of the family household.

See cases

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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listed 93 ALR 3rd, 420, 449-451.

Likewise, there are

numerous other cases in which such a child has been held
not to be a resident of the family household.
451-453.

Id. at

However, it is patently clear that the questior

00

to coverage is one of fact and not law. Each case, regardl10o:
of the outcome, turns upon the circumstances existing at
the time the liability was claimed.

It is the factfinder

who must decide whether coverage exists.

As long as there

are conflicting versions of the evidence or conflicting
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the matter must
be submitted to the factfinder.

The instant case clearly ··

valved a dispute which required submission and determination by the jury.
B.
There Existed Substantial Disoutes
as to the Inferences to be Drawn from ~he
Evidence Which Required Submission to the
Jury of Whether William Charles Dennis
Was a Resident of His Father's Household.
It is interesting to note that in this case De
in-Intervention first moved for summary judgment based
the argument that the evidence was uncontroverted
that William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's
household.

(R. 63-73).

Similarly, Plaintiff also movec

for summary judgment based upon the assumption that
the evidence was clear and undisputed

t~a~ ~i:lis~

Char:es

Dennis was not a resident of his father's housenold.
(R. 133-145).
After extensive argument before the Honorable
Bryant Croft, both motions were denied.
-14-

(R.

147).
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I

l_

Croft held that there was clearly a question of
fact based upon the conflicting inferences to be drawn
from the basically undisputed facts in the record.
After the denial of the two motions, it was
the Defendants-in-Intervention who made a demand for a
jury trial.

(R. 170).

After submission of the case to

the jury Defendants-in-Intervention moved for a directed
verdict in their favor.

The court took the motion

under advisement but submitted the issue of residency
to the jury on a special verdict form.

(R. 198).

Thus, it was not until some 45 days after the
verdict had been rendered that the lower court decided that
there was no proper question for the jury to determine and
that the issue should have been ruled upon as a matter of
law.

Up until this time, both Judge Croft, in reviewing

the motion for summary judgment and Judge Banks, in submitting the issue to the jury, had concluded there was
sufficient evidence to merit jury consideration.
Appellant submits that this initial determination
by the two judges was correct based upon the substantial
difference in the contentions of the parties relating to
the facts and the inferences to be drawn from them.

A

review of the record shows substantial questions of fact
which should have been submitted to the jury for its
determination.
The instant case is analagous to the case of Aetna
Casualty and Suretv Company of Hartford, Connecticut v.
I
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Means, 382 F.2d 26

(10th Cir. 1967).

In that case a

declaratory action was brought to determine whether a son
was a member of the insured father's household.

The case

was tried to a jury and the identical question, as in the
instant case, was submitted to it.

The jury determined

that the son was a member of the household.

The insurance

company moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or '
for a new trial.

Both motions were denied.

The

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower
court judgment and denial of the motion, stated the
following pertinent observation:
There is no substantial conflict in the
testimony as to the pertinent evidentiary
facts.
There is a big difference between
the contentions of the oarties as to the
inference of ultimate facts to be drawn
from the established evidentiarv facts.
Id. at 27. (Emphasis added).
The court in Aetna reviewed the evidence favoring
the position of both the plaintiff and the defendant to
illustrate the substantial differences existing in the
contentions of the parties.

A similar listing in the

instant case reveals the substantial dispute

between

Defendants and Plaintiff.
The evidence favoring the position of the Plaintiff
was to the effect that:
(1)
For more than six years preceding the
accident William Charles Dennis had been
financially independent and self-supporting,
and that because he did not get along with
his father he made only very few visits
of short duration to his family in Utah.
(Tr. 443-445, 458).
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(2)
At the time of the accident, William
Dennis was merely staying with his family on
a temporary basis for so long as it would take
to overcome his drug dependency problem.
Because of the friction which he had with his
father, he indicated that he intended to be
present in his father's house no longer
than necessary.
(Tr. 457-458).
(3)
The father, Donald R. Dennis, considered
his son to only be residing at the residence
until he could get enough money to go back to
Florida and had an understanding with his
son that he would only stay there long enough
to get himself straightened out.
(Tr. 498).

(4)
William Charles Dennis lived in Florida
for nearly two years prior to his return to
visit in Utah -- one year of which was with
his girlfriend Carol Ketchum.
During his
residency in Florida he worked in several
jobs, including operation of heavy equipment.
(Tr. 446-447).
(5) When he arrived in Florida he had a Utah
driver's license. He surrendered this license
and received a Florida chauffer's license
in its ?iace in 197'.
ITr. H7-448).
6)
When William Charles Den~is arrived in
Florida he had a 1963 Chevrolet El Camara
which was registered in Utah.
Upon arriving
he changed ~he registra~ion to Florida plates.
(Tr. 448).

(7)
While he was in Florida he filed a
Florida state income tax return for the year
1977.
(Tr. 449).
(8)
Before leaving Florida he moved into an
apartment with a female friend and took all of
his household goods, furniture and personal
effects. Hei::aid one-half of the rent that was
due for the month prior to his leaving.
(9)
At the time he left Florida his two televisions, his living room furniture, kitchen
goods, and eight-track stereo, several hundred
books, wall pictur~s, clocks, and most of his
clothing remained in the apartment.
(Tr.
452-454).
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(10)
When he came to Utah he only
brought with him a small amount of clothing,
himself, his car, and his dog.
(Tr. 454).
(11)
Dennis stated that he left his things
in Florida because his trip to Utah was more
or less a spur of the moment type thing and
he always intended on going back.
He
stated it was not like he was leaving his
friends and everything in Florida, but just
needed to get away for a while to straighten
himself out.
(Tr. 455-456).
(12)
When asked whether he intended on going
back to his apartment upon leaving Florida
he stated he did then and still did at the day
of trial.
He stated that on the day of the
accident he fully intended on going back to
Florida also.
(Tr. 454).

(13)
Dennis stated that he had made no arranqements to bring back any of his possessions from
Florida and had made no effort to change his
license plates from Florida plates to Utah.
(Tr. 464) .
(14)
At the time of the accident Dennis was
driving under the authority of a Florida
chauffer's license.
(Tr. 447-448).
(15)
Dennis stated that while he could not
recall the address of the house in which his
furnishings were left, he would have had no
trouble in finding the house itself and that the
female roommate there had an ongoing residence
in which he was always welcome. He stated that
as far as he was concerned he had a household
in Florida and that he could have returned to it
at any time and still could at the time of
trial.
(Tr. 476-478).
(16)
Even though ~r. Donald R. Dennis received
an application to renew t~e insurance approximately two weeks prior to the accident, he ~ade
no change on the application to add his son
William Charles Dennis as an additional driver
of the family automobile.
Exhibit 4, ~r. p.
490) •

(17)
Neither William Charles Dennis nor his
parents could recall him ever driving the cars
belonging to his parents but stated he always
drove his own automobile.
(Tr. 462, 501,
Sponsored by the S.J.
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On the other hand, the evidence favoring the position
of the Defendant and the Defendants-in-Intervention was to
the effect that:
(1)
William Charles Dennis had lived in his
father's home from the latter part of November
1977 up to and including the day of the accident, February 25, 1978, a oeriod of about
three months.
(Tr. 465).
(2)
At the time he had left Florida he had
only been residing in the apartment with the
female roommate for one month and could
not even recall the address of the apartment
or the roommate's name.
(Tr. 450-451).
(3)
During the first two months of his visit
his mother took care of him and gave him a lot
of personal attention so be could recover from
his drug addiction.
(Tr. 508).

(4)
During the third month he obtained a job
at the Bangerter Trucking Company and was making
about $600 amonth driving a truck.
(Tr. 461).
(5)
At the time he applied for the job with
the trucking company he used his father's address
on the application.
(Tr. 466).
(6)
During the three month period that he
resided with his father he was not paying
rent on any other residence, although he was
not paying rent at his father's place either.
(Tr. 4 67) .
(7)
William Charles Dennis ate most of his
meals at his =ather's residence and slept there.
He had his ow:-i room at the house.
(Tr. 467-468).

rs)

His ?are:-its bought their son small items
articles and gave him some spending
resided with them.
(Tr. 502).

s'..lc~. as ~oilet
::ione~· ·..ihile '."le

(9)
At the time of the accident William Charles
Dennis gave his address on the police report
as that of his father's.
(Tr. 468). While his
father was under the distinct impression his
son would not be staying with him long the
subject was never specifically discussed.
(Tr.
501) .
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Certainly, even a cursory review of the arguments
propounded by both sides throughout the trial and in their
legal memoranda (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of
Summary Judgment, R. 133-146; Plaintiff's Memorandum
in Opposition to Judgment n.o.v. R.

346-360; Defendants-in-

Intervention's Memorandum for Summary Judgment; R.
65-126; Defendant and Defendants-in-Intervention's
Memorandum for Judgment n.o.v. or New Trial, R. 311-320)
shows that there were substantial disputes as to the
inferences to be drawn from the existing set of facts
and circumstances.

It is the weighing of all of these

contentions by a trier of fact which determines whether a
person can be said to have been a resident of the insured's
household.
When there are material facts in dispute or cornpeti,,:
reasonable inferences, a trial is required in order that t:1s
trier of fact may evaluate the position of both parties.
Lecus v. American Mutual Insurance Company of Boston, 260
241 (Wis. 1977).

~

"It is for the jury, not the court, to

determine the effect of such inferences and circumstances."
Aetna v. Means,

~,

p. 29.

Thus, the lower court correctly submitted the
determination of residency to the jury and correctly entered
judgment in accordance with such verdict.

As noted earlier,

however, the error occurred in the court's subsequent act100
of overturning the verdict and entering judgment as a matter
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of law.
C.
The Determination of the Jury Was
Supported by Substantial Evidence and
the Court Therefore Erred in Overruling
the Verdict.
It is fundamental that a trial court can enter a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict only where there is an
absence of any substantial evidence to support the verdict.
In determining whether a judgment n.o.v. should be granted,
all of the testimony and all reasonable inferences flowing
therefrom which tend to prove the jury verdict must be
accepted as true, and all conflicts and all evidence which
tends to disprove it must be disregarded.
'1arket, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566

Koer v. Mayfair

(Utah 1967).

In a more recent case, this Court stated:
A motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict presents solely a question of
law to be determined by the court.
In
passing on a motion of this kind, the
court is not justified in trespassing in
the province of the jury in its prerogative
to judge all questions of fact in the case.
The court is not free to weigh the evidence,
and the weight of the evidence and the
credibility of the witnesses are within the
jury's sole province.
In considering the verdict, the trial court
must view the evidence most favorable to the
party against whom the motion is made.
This court must apply the same standards
in its review of th2 case.
~inters v. W.
S. Hatch Company, Inc., 546 P.3d 603, 605
(Ctah 1976).
Thus, Respondents in the instant case have a heavy
burden to carry on this appeal.

The question is not whether

William Charles Dennis was a resident of his father's
household
but is whether there was a sufficient dispute
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to warrant submission to the jury in the first instance
to support the jury's determination.

Appellant submits

that Respondents will be unable to carry this burden.
As has been previously noted, there was clearly a
substantial dispute as to the inferences to be drawn from

t:i~

evidence and both parties argued vigorously that each factor
supported or opposed a finding of residency.

The same

factors which allowed the submission to the jury also
supports the jury verdict in that there was obviously substantial evidence presented by the plaintiff to show that
William Charles Dennis could be found not to be a resident
of his father's household.

The numerous facts previously

recited together with the criteria developed by courts of
law throughout the country unquestionably support the jury's

conclusions.
The instant case is

s~milar

to the recent case of

c'lel Hardman Productions v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913
:~hereas

(Utah 1979). ·

this case involved a dispute as to an insurance

contract, the Hardman case involved a dispute as to a motion
picture contract.

Whereas the instant case concerned the

words "residence" and "household," the Hardman case concerr.ed
the word "photoplay."
In Hardman, just as in the instant case,

mot~ons

summary judgment were filed by the parties and were denied
by a district court judge because of the large issues of fact
to be resolved.

Again, in both cases, the jury was asked a

simple yes or no question in terms of the issue being raised.
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In both cases the trial judge overturned the finding of the
jury and entered a judgment n.o.v.
This Court in Hardman found that such action was
clear error since the meaning of the term "photoplay" as
used in the contract was a question of fact for the jury.
This Court noted that the lower court is obliged to not
only look at the evidence but also to all reasonable inferences
that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the parties moved against. The judgment of the lower court
was accordingly reversed and the jury verdict reinstated.
The granting of the judgment n.o.v. by the lower
court in the instant case was also clearly erroneous.
The jury was entitled to utilize the court's instructions
as well as common sense to determine whether William
Charles Dennis could be deemed to be a resident of his
father's household within the common meaning of such words.
Because of the substantial variance of circumstances
and inferences argued by both parties in this lawsuit,
it was impossible for any court to state, as a matter of law,
that William Charles Dennis was or was not a resident of his
father's household.

Since a court could not make such a

determination on motions for summary judgment, or on motions
for directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence,

t~e

court similarly could not make the determination of a post
trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

-23-
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For these reasons, the

lower court committed

prejudicial error in granting the judgment n.o.v. when
the issue was clearly ripe for jury determination and
where there was substantial evidence to support the jury's
conclusion.

I

CONCLCSION
The issue in this case goes beyond the deterrninati·Jr:
of Defendant's insurability under the terms of his father's
policy.

The true issue raised by this appeal concerns the

fundamental right to trial by jury and the power a court
may exercise in diluting that right.
The initial determination of whether a ":>erso:-i qual1'.:'I
as an additional insured via the "resident of household"
inclusion is, almost without exception, always a question
for ..the trier of fact.

In this case, a brief review of the

numerous memoranda and the testimony given at trial
shows the substantial dispute which occurred as to the
various factors and circumstances argued to support or oppose
such residency.
The question was clearly ripe for jury determinatior.. I
The lower court could not, as a matter of law, have enter2d
judgment for either party on motions for summar:,' J'.ldqT"ent
or motions for directed verdicts.

The subsequent entry

of a post judgment motion was equally erroneous

i:

·:ie·,; .Jf

substantial evidence which would have supported the jury
regardless of which side it supported.
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The lower court during the motion for judgment
n.o.v. admitted that the evidence showed William Charles
Dennis was a resident of Florida when he left and that Dennis
always intended on returning back there as soon as possible.
The court, however, discounted these factors and substituted
other factors which the court thought more compelling.

Such

weighing of factors was for the jury -- not the court.
It was for the jury to consider all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding William Dennis' travels, desires, and living
habits.

It was for the jury to decide if these events met

the instructed criteria for "residency of a household."
The jury did decide.

This Court must reinstate that

decision.
Respectfully submitted,

~?!~
DAVID H. EPPERSON
Attorney for Appellant
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